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INVESTOR HETEROGENEITY AND THE CROSS-SECTION OF  
U.K. INVESTMENT TRUST PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
 We use the upper and lower bounds derived by Ferson and Lin(2010) to examine the 
impact of investor heterogeneity on the performance of U.K. investment trusts relative to 
alternative linear factor models.  We find using the upper bounds that investor heterogeneity has 
an important impact for nearly all investment trusts.  The upper bounds are large in economic 
terms and significantly different from zero.  We find no evidence of any trusts where all 
investors agree on the sign of performance beyond what we expect by chance.  Using the lower 
bound, we find that trusts with a larger disagreement about trust performance have a weaker 
relation between the trust premium and past Net Asset Value (NAV) performance.  
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I Introduction 
 When financial markets are incomplete, there is not a unique stochastic discount factor to 
evaluate fund performance1.  Ferson(2010) and Ferson and Lin(2010) point out that since 
marginal utility growth will vary across clients in incomplete markets, fund performance will be 
clientele specific.  Investor heterogeneity becomes an important issue in evaluating fund 
performance and different clienteles of investors could value the same fund very differently2.  
The issue of investor heterogeneity is commonly ignored in performance studies where a given 
benchmark model is used to evaluate the performance of managed funds.  Ferson and Lin derive 
upper and lower bounds of the impact of investor heterogeneity on fund performance using a 
given benchmark model of expected returns.  They find that investor heterogeneity has a 
substantial impact on the performance of open-end U.S. mutual funds. 
 We use the Ferson and Lin(2010) bounds to examine the impact of investor heterogeneity 
on the performance of U.K. investment trusts3 with U.K. equity objectives relative to a number 
of alternative benchmark models.  Our study is the first one to incorporate the bounds of Ferson 
and Lin in the evaluation of closed-end fund performance and complements the recent study of 
Ferson and Lin.  The performance of closed-end funds could be different from open-end funds 
since closed-end funds are not subject to the impact of cash flows coming into and out of the 
fund (Elton, Gruber and Busse(1998)).  Elton et al also point out the closed-end funds might be 
                                                          
1
 See Chen and Knez(1996) for an overview of evaluating fund performance using the stochastic 
discount factor approach. 
2
 The issue of investor heterogeneity on fund performance is also explored implicitly in the 
papers by Chen and Knez(1996) and Ahn, Cao and Chretien(2009). 
3
 Investment trusts are equivalent to closed-end U.S. mutual funds. 
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subject to greater agency costs since investors cannot redeem their shares at NAV.  We extend 
the prior literature of U.K. closed-end fund performance such as Bal and Leger(1996), 
Bangassa(1999), and Fletcher and Marshall(2012) among others by examining the impact of 
investor heterogeneity on trust performance using specific benchmark models.  We also examine 
the impact of investor heterogeneity on the relation between the trust premium and lagged Net 
Asset Value (NAV) performance.   
 There are three main findings in our study.  First, we find no evidence that there are 
individual trusts which either add or destroy value to investors beyond what we would expect by 
chance.  Second, we find that the upper bounds are large in economic terms and are significantly 
different from zero.  We find that there are no trusts where all investors agree on the sign of 
performance beyond what we would expect by chance.  Third, we find using the lower bounds 
that trusts with a larger disagreement about performance have a weaker relation between the trust 
premium and the past NAV performance.  Our results suggest that investor heterogeneity has a 
significant impact on U.K. equity closed-end fund performance. 
 Our paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the research method.  Section III 
discusses the data in our study.  Section IV reports the empirical results and the final section 
concludes. 
II Research Method 
A) Fund Performance and Investor Heterogeneity 
 Ross(1978), Harrison and Kreps(1979), and Hansen and Richard(1987) show that if the 
Law of One Price (LOP) holds in financial markets, there exists a stochastic discount factor mt 
such that: 
                                         Et-1(mtxit) = pit-1                           IRUL «1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where xit is the payoff of primitive asset i at time t, pit-1 is the price of asset i at time t-1, Et-1 is a 
expected value conditional on information available to investors at time t-1, and N is the number 
of primitive assets.  Equation (1) states that the conditional expected risk-adjusted payoff of asset 
i at time t has a price equal to pit-1.  Where the payoff is a gross return (1+return), the price equals 
1.  Where the payoff is an excess return, the price equals zero.  Where financial markets satisfy 
the No Arbitrage (NA) restriction, mt will be positive in every state of nature (Cochrane(2005)).  
In complete markets mt will be unique.   
 Chen and Knez(1996) develop a framework to evaluate fund performance using the 
stochastic discount factor approach4.  Define yt as a candidate model of the stochastic discount 
factor.  Using the excess returns on the fund, the conditional performance of the fund is given by: 
                         Įpt-1 = Et-1(ytrpt)                                                       (2)  
where rpt is the excess return of the fund at time t.  The conditional performance of the fund 
captures the difference between the expected risk-adjusted excess return of the fund at time t 
conditional on available information at time t-1 minus its price, which is zero.   
Ferson and Lin(2010) show that the relevant stochastic discount factor to use to evaluate 
fund performance is the marginal utility growth of the client.  When markets are incomplete, 
marginal utility growth can vary between clients and so performance will be clientele specific.  
This issue is ignored in performance studies where funds are evaluated relative to specific 
benchmark models and all investors are assumed to place the same value on the fund.  Ferson 
                                                          
4
 Aragon and Ferson(2008) provide an excellent overview of different fund performance 
measures and provide a survey of managed fund performance.  Ferson(2010,2012) provides a 
review of the fund performance literature and shows how the stochastic discount factor approach 
can be used to unify a number of important issues in fund performance. 
4 
 
and Lin derive upper and lower bounds of the impact of investor heterogeneity on fund 
performance measures using specific benchmark models.  They derive their bounds by 
considering a regression of the excess fund returns on a constant and the excess returns of the N 
primitive assets: 
                         rpt = ap Ȉn=1Nȕpnrnt + upt                                                 (3) 
where rnt LVWKHH[FHVVUHWXUQRIWKHSULPLWLYHDVVHWQDWWLPHWȕpn is the beta of fund p relative to 
asset n, upt is the residual term of fund p at time t with E(upt) = 0 and E(uptrnt IRUQ «1
The intercept in regression (3) ap is equivalent to the performance measures of Jensen(1968) and 
Connor and Korajczyk(1986) where the N assets are the excess returns on the factors in a given 
benchmark model.  We can consider each benchmark model as specifying different sets of the N 
primitive assets.  We refer to ap relative to a given factor model as the Jensen performance of the 
fund.     
Ferson and Lin take the unconditional expectation of equation (2) (E(Įp)) and substitute 
into the regression model (3) to derive their bounds5.  The upper bound is given by: 
                 _(Įp)/E(yt)-ap_ıXpt)SRmax                                                         (4) 
where E(ytLVWKHH[SHFWHGYDOXHRIWKHVWRFKDVWLFGLVFRXQWIDFWRUıXpt) is the residual volatility 
from equation (3), and SRmax is the maximum Sharpe ratio that can be attained by investors in 
the set of N primitive excess returns6.  The lower bound is given by: 
_(Įp)/E(yt)-ap__ȡyu_ıXpt)SRmax                                                          (5) 
                                                          
5
 See Ferson and Lin(2010) for full details as to the derivation of their bounds. 
6
 This analysis is linked to the good deal option pricing bounds of Cochrane and Saa-
Requejo(2000). 
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ZKHUHȡyu is the correlation between the stochastic discount factor and the residuals of the fund 
from equation (3). 
 Ferson and Lin(2010) point ouW WKDW ZKHQ ȡyu = 0, then the factors in the benchmark 
model capture the marginal utility growth of all clients and so investor heterogeneity will have 
no impact on fund performance.  7KHKLJKHUWKHYDOXHVDUHIRUıXpt) and SRmax, the greater the 
impact that investor heterogeneity will have fund performance relative to a specific benchmark 
model.  Ferson and Lin point out that the use of unconditional moments is valid as long as the 
law of iterated expectations can be applied.  They note that if investors know less information 
than used in a given empirical study or do not form expectations using mathematical conditional 
expectations, then heterogeneity in the beliefs of investors becomes an important issue.  The 
bounds can also apply to the use of conditional moments where clients use the same public 
information set. 
B) Estimating the Ferson and Lin(2010) Bounds 
 We estimate the unconditional upper bound of Ferson and Lin(2010) using the factors in  
a given benchmark model.  The UHVLGXDOYRODWLOLW\RIWKHIXQGıXpt)) comes from the standard 
deviation of the residuals from equation (3).  We use the adjusted maximum Sharpe ratio of 
Ferson and Siegel(2003) to compute SRmax when N>1, as in Ferson and Lin, which corrects for 
the upward bias in the estimated maximum Sharpe ratios using Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation7.  The adjusted squared Sharpe ratio is given by [(T-N-2)/T]SR2 ± N/T, where T is the 
number of observations and SR2 is the ML estimate of the maximum squared Sharpe ratio.  
We also estimate the upper bound of Ferson and Lin(2010) using conditional moments.  
We assume that the conditional expected excess returns of the trusts and the factor excess returns 
                                                          
7
 Ferson and Siegel(2003) derive their adjusted Sharpe ratio under multivariate normality. 
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in a given linear factor model are a linear function of a set of lagged information variables, 
denoted by Zt-1, and that the conditional second moments are constant.  The residual volatility is 
then given by the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of the trust excess 
returns on a constant, the lagged information variables, and the N excess factor returns (Ferson 
and Lin).  The conditional maximum Sharpe ratio is computed each period using the fitted values 
from the predictive regressions of the N factor excess returns on the lagged information variables 
as the conditional expected excess returns and the constant conditional covariance matrix is 
given by the ML estimate of the residual covariance matrix from the predictive regressions.  The 
expected value of the upper bound is then given by the residual volatility multiplied by the 
average conditional maximum Sharpe ratio8.   
 To evaluate statistical tests of the upper bounds, we use the bootstrap resampling 
approach of Fama and French(2010).  Fama and French use the bootstrap resampling approach9  
to simulate the cross-sectional distribution of fund performance under the null hypothesis of zero 
fund performance to compare whether the best and worst performing funds are greater than or 
worse than what we observe in a world of zero fund performance.    We adapt the bootstrap 
resampling approach to generate the simulated distribution of the upper bounds of Ferson and 
Lin(2010) in a world of zero performance using 10,000 bootstrap samples.  We estimate the 
standard errors of the upper bounds as the standard deviation of the simulated upper bounds across 
                                                          
8
 We also correct the average conditional maximum Sharpe ratio using the adjustment in Ferson 
and Siegel(2003) when N>1. 
9
 Full details of the bootstrap approach is included in an appendix, which is available on request.  
We also use the bootstrap approach to simulate the cross-sectional distribution of trust 
performance when there is zero performance. 
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the 10,000 trials.  We use the standard errors of the upper bounds to compute the t-statistics of the 
null hypothesis that the upper bounds equal zero to examine whether investor heterogeneity is an 
important issue for each trust.  We use a one-tail test to examine this hypothesis.  If investor 
heterogeneity has no significant impact on the performance of a given trust, we expect the upper 
bound to equal zero.   
As an alternative test of the impact of investor heterogeneity on trust performance, we 
consider the issue of whether there are any trusts for which all investors would agree on the sign of 
performance.  Ferson and Lin(2010) point out that all investors will only agree on the sign of 
performance when the absolute value of ap is larger than the upper bound.  We compute the cross-
sectional distribution of |ap| - Upper Bound.  Investors will only agree on the sign of performance 
when |ap| - Upper Bound > 0.  We use the bootstrap resampling approach of Fama and French(2010) 
and estimate the cross-sectional simulated distribution of |ap| - Upper Bound in a world of zero 
performance.  We compare the actual cross-sectional distribution with the simulated distribution to 
examine the null hypothesis that |ap| - Upper Bound = 0 at selected percentiles by calculating the 
proportion of times out of the 10,000 trials that the simulated |ap| - Upper Bound lie below the actual 
|ap| - Upper Bound.  If all investors agree on the sign of performance, for the percentiles where |ap| - 
Upper Bound > 0, we expect the proportion of simulated |ap| - Upper Bound values lower than the 
actual value to be close to 1. 
 We use the lower bound of Ferson and Lin(2010) to examine whether investor 
heterogeneity has any impact on the relation between the premium of the trust and past NAV 
performance given the performance theory of the discount (e.g. Berk and Stanton(2007))10.  
Ferson and Lin use the lower bound to examine whether investor heterogeneity has any impact 
                                                          
10
 We are grateful to the reviewer suggesting that we explore this issue. 
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on the relation between fund flows and past performance for open-end mutual funds.  The 
performance theory of the discount predicts that there is a positive relation between the trust 
premium and lagged NAV performance.  We conjecture that this relation would be weaker for 
those trusts where there is a greater disagreement among investors over trust performance.   
 We use a measure of disagreement (Disagreep) motivated by the first disagreement 
measure of Ferson and Lin(2010).  Ferson and Lin estimate their measure for each fund as 
ıXptı_ȡXpt*_ ZKHUH ȡXpt,G) is the correlation between the residuals of the fund and the 
electricity consumption growth of a given U.S. state.  The state electricity consumption growth is 
used to proxy for marginal utility growth of different investors (see Da and Yun(2010)).  The 
ı_ȡXpt,G)|) terms captures the variation across investors of the absolute correlations between the 
IXQG¶V UHVLGXals and marginal utility growth.  The larger the residual volatility of the fund and 
the greater the variation in absolute correlations across investors, the larger the Disagreep 
measure. 
 Given the need to estimate the marginal utility growth of different investors and the 
unavailability of disaggregated electricity consumption growth in the U.K. for our whole sample 
period, we adopt a different approach in our study.  We back out proxies of marginal utility 
growth using the Hansen and Jagannathan(1991) NA volatility bounds.  The NA volatility 
bounds are the set of minimum variance nonnegative (admissible) stochastic discount factors that 
price a set of test assets.  Chen and Knez(1996) point out that a NA admissible stochastic 
discount factor can be viewed as the marginal utility growth of an investor11.  By selecting 
                                                          
11
 Ahn et al(2009) extend the work of Chen and Knez(1996) by deriving the performance bounds 
of a fund implied by a set of NA admissible stochastic discount factors.  They interpret the upper 
(lower) performance bound as the performance value of the fund from the perspective of the 
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different NA admissible stochastic discount factors from the NA volatility bounds, we are 
implicitly capturing the marginal utility growth of different investors. 
 We estimate the NA volatility bounds using the gross returns of a set of payoffs in U.K. 
stock returns across the whole sample period.  We select 25 NA admissible stochastic discount 
factors that lie on the bounds by setting E(m) initially to 0.975 and increasing E(m) by 0.001 at a 
time.  For each trust, we calculate the correlations between upt and each of the NA admissible 
stochastic discount factors and estimate the corresponding Disagreep measure.  Our approach is 
admittedly ad hoc and could be sensitive to the set of payoffs we use to calculate the bounds and 
number of admissible stochastic discount factors selected. 
 We use the Fama and MacBeth(1973) cross-sectional regression approach to examine the 
impact of investor heterogeneity on the relation between the trust premium and past NAV 
performance.  Each year between 1993 and 2010, we run the cross-sectional regression: 
              Prempt  Ȗ0t Ȗ1tapt Ȗ2tapt*Disagreep + Control Variablespt + ept          (6) 
where Prempt is the average monthly premium during year t for trust p, and apt is the past NAV 
performance relative to a linear factor model for trust p at the start of year t.  We measure the 
premium as the ratio of the share price to NAV at the end of each month.  We estimate the past 
performance for all trusts with continuous NAV excess returns during the past 36 months.  We 
assume that the Disagreep measure is fixed for each trust and we use both the actual values of 
Disagreep measure and construct dummy variables of the Disagreep measure as in Ferson and 
Lin(2010).  We construct two dummy variables, DisagreepH which equals 1 if the trust is in the 
largest 1/3 of Disagreep measures across trusts and 0 otherwise, and DisagreepM which equals 1 if 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
investor clientele most (least) favorable to the fund.  Fletcher and Marshall(2012) use the NA 
performance bounds of Ahn et al(2009) to evaluate the performance of U.K. investment trusts. 
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the trust is in the middle 1/3 of Disagreep measures across trusts and 0 otherwise.  When we use 
dummy variables for the Disagreep measure, there will be two interaction independent variables 
in equation (6).  The time-series average of WKH DQQXDO Ȗ FRHIILFLHQWV DUH XVHG DV WKH ILQDO
estimates and the t-statistics are calculated from the time-VHULHVRIWKHDQQXDOȖt coefficients.  The 
use of the Fama and MacBeth approach controls for the impact of residual cross-correlations 
across trusts.  If investor heterogeneity has an impact on the relation between the premium and 
past NAV performance, we expect the average values of the slope coefficients on the interaction 
variables (i.eȖ2) to be significantly negative.   
 We use a selection of control variables in equation (6) using a subset of similar variables 
in Khorana, Servaes and Wedge(2009).  We use the log of the total NAV of the trust, annual DY, 
and age of the trust at the start of year t.  We calculate the age of the trust as in Ferson and 
Lin(2010) as the log of the number of months since the trust began.  We do not include a control 
variable for the expense ratio as Khorana et al find no relation between fund expenses and the 
premium (see also Malkiel(1977)). 
IV Data 
 All of the data for this study is collected from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) 
from the London Business School unless otherwise specified.  Full details of our sample of 
trusts, the construction of the factors in the linear factor models, and lagged information 
variables used in our study are included in an appendix, which is available on request. 
A) Sample of Investment Trusts 
Our sample of funds includes all U.K. investment trusts with a U.K. equity objective 
between January 1990 and December 2010.  The U.K. equity sectors include the U.K. Growth, 
U.K. Growth and Income, U.K. Small Companies, and U.K. High Income investment sectors.  
The investment sector information for each trust is collected at the start of each year from Money 
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Management12 between 1990 and 2009 and the Association of Investment Companies (AIC) web 
site for the last year.  There are 221 investment trusts in our sample.  Our sample of trusts should 
be relatively free of survivorship bias (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross(1992)).  However 
our results using individual trusts can be affected by the reverse survivorship bias of 
Linnainmaa(2012).  Linnainmaa argues that reverse survivorship bias leads to an understatement 
of true performance when funds disappear because of poor performance where the poor 
performance is in part due to negative idiosyncratic shocks. 
For each trust, we collect the stock returns of the trusts and calculate excess returns using 
the monthly return of the one-month U.K. Treasury Bill (collected from LSPD and Datastream) 
as the risk-free asset.  Aragon and Ferson(2008) interpret the use of fund returns which are gross 
of all trading costs and expenses as capturing the performance ability of funds and where fund 
returns are net of all costs and expenses as capturing the value added to investors.  The use of 
stock returns for investment trusts does capture the value added of the trust to investors.  The 
value added depends not only on performance ability, costs, expenses, but also on the behavior 
of the trust premium13.  We also calculate the NAV returns of the trusts using the monthly NAV 
                                                          
12
 The investment sectors have changed names over the years.  The four sectors are the current 
names of the U.K. investment sectors as at the end of the sample period.  In the early part of the 
sample period, there was a U.K. General sector.  We allocate trusts in the U.K. General sector to 
the U.K. Growth sector since most trusts transferred to this sector when the classifications 
changed. 
13
 See Dimson and Minio-Paluello(2002) for a review of the alternative explanations of the 
closed-end fund discount.  Recent studies by Berk and Stanton(2007) and Cherkes, Sagi and 
Stanton(2009) develop theories of the fund premium in relation to expectations about future 
12 
 
of the trusts collected from Datastream and the dividends paid by the trusts.  We estimate the 
performance and the lower and upper bounds of Ferson and Lin(2010) for all trusts with greater 
than 24 return observations, which creates a look-ahead bias (Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and 
Musto(2002)).   
B) Linear Factor Models 
 We evaluate the performance of the investment trusts using five linear factor models.  We 
use domestic factor models since the trusts are U.K. equity funds and Griffin(2002) finds that a 
local version of the Fama and French(1993) model performs better than the global version of the 
model.  The models include: 
1. CAPM 
This model is a single-factor model that uses the excess returns (over the one-month 
Treasury Bill return) of the U.K. stock market index (Market) as the proxy for aggregate wealth. 
2. Fama and French(1993) (FF) 
 The FF model is a three-factor model.  The factors are the excess return on the market 
index and two zero-cost portfolios that capture the size (SMB) and value/growth (HML) effects 
in stock returns.  We use the price-to-book (PB) ratio from Datastream to capture the 
value/growth effects. 
3. Carhart(1997) 
The Carhart model is a four-factor model.  The factors are the three factors in the FF 
model and a zero-cost portfolio that captures the momentum effect (WML) in stock returns.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
managerial performance ability or to the liquidity benefits provided by the funds.  
Ramadorai(2012) provides support for these theories in explaining the closed hedge fund 
premium. 
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4. Four-index model (4-index) 
This model is a four-factor model and is motivated by the four-index model in Cremers, 
Petajisto and Zitzewitz(2010).  Cremers et al advocate the use of index-based models to capture 
the size and value/growth effects in stock returns.  The factors include the excess returns (over 
the one-month Treasury Bill return) on the largest 100 stocks (Large), the difference in returns 
between small stocks and large stocks (S-L), the difference in returns between low PB stocks and 
high PB stocks across all companies (AHML), and WML. 
5. Seven-index model (7-index) 
 This model is a seven-factor model and is motivated by the seven-index model in 
Cremers et al(2010).  The factors include the excess returns on the largest 100 stocks, the 
difference in returns between small stocks and mid-cap stocks (S-M), the difference in returns 
between mid-cap stocks and large stocks (M-L), the difference in returns between low PB stocks 
and high PB stocks across large companies (LHML), the difference in returns between low PB 
stocks and high PB stocks across mid-cap companies (MHML), the difference in returns between 
low PB stocks and high PB stocks across small companies (SHML), and WML. 
 Table 1 present summary statistics of the monthly excess returns of the sample of 
investment trusts and the factors in the linear factor models.  The summary statistics include the 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of monthly excess returns (%).  In panel A 
of the table, all trusts with greater than 24 stock return observations are sorted separately by the 
statistic in the column and various percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution across individual 
trusts are reported.  Panel B reports the summary statistics for the factors in the linear factor 
models. 
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 Panel A of Table 1 shows that there is a wide spread in the cross-section of the summary 
statistics of the stock excess returns of the individual trusts.  The average excess returns range 
between -0.774% for the bottom 10% of trusts and 1.050% for the top 10% of trusts.  The 
volatility of excess returns ranges between 5.121% for the bottom 10% of trusts and 18.491% for 
the top 10% of trusts.  The median average excess return is larger than the average excess market 
return in panel B but the median volatility is considerably larger than the volatility of the market 
excess returns.   The summary statistics of the individual trusts suggest that there is substantial 
heterogeneity across trusts. 
 The WML factor has the largest average excess returns of the factors in panel B of Table 
1.  There is a large significant positive average excess return on the WML factor of 1.015% 
which highlights the strong momentum effect in U.K. stock returns during this sample period.  
The only other factors with significant positive average excess returns are the HML factor and 
the HML (Small) factor, which suggests that the value/growth effect is strongest in smaller 
companies during our sample period.  There is no significant size effect as the average excess 
returns on the SMB, S-L, S-M, and M-L factors are tiny.  The average excess market returns are 
also not statistically significant due to impact of the large market downturn in 2007 and 2008.   
C) Test Assets Used To Form NA Admissible Stochastic Discount Factors and Lagged 
Information Variables 
 We use the gross returns of a set of nine payoffs when forming the minimum variance 
NA admissible stochastic discount factors that we use to proxy for the marginal utility growth of 
different clients to estimate the lower bound of Ferson and Lin(2010).  We use the six size/PB 
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index portfolios used in the formation of the 7-index model of Cremers et al(2010), the Winners 
and Losers portfolios used to form the WML factor, and the Datastream U.K. government bond 
index (All Lives).  To estimate the upper bound of Ferson and Lin(2010) using a model of 
conditional moments, we use a similar set of lagged information variables as in Ferson and 
Lin(2010).  We use the lagged annualized dividend yield on the market index, the lagged return 
on the three-month U.K. Treasury Bill, the lagged term spread, and the lagged default spread14.  
IV Empirical Results 
 We begin our empirical analysis by examining the cross-sectional distribution in 
individual trust performance.  Table 2 reports percentiles from the cross-sectional distribution of 
individual trust performance for all trusts.  The table reports the percentiles for the Jensen 
performance (ap), the standard error of performance (SE(ap)), and the volatility of the residuals 
ıupt)) where the trusts are sorted separately by the statistic in the column.  The final column of 
Table 2 reports the performance and t-statistic in parentheses of the value weighted portfolio of 
all trusts (ap(VW)) relative to each model.  The standard errors and t-statistics in Table 2 are 
corrected for the effects of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the automatic lag 
selection (without prewhitening) of Newey and West(1994).    
 
Table 2 here 
 
                                                          
14
 The motivation for including these information variables stems from the large literature on 
predictable stock returns.  See Lettau and Ludvigson(2010) for an excellent review of this 
literature. 
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 Table 2 shows that there is a large cross-sectional spread in individual trust performance.  
This result holds for all linear factor models.  The median ap is positive for all models except for 
the FF model where the median negative performance is tiny.  The average trust performance is 
positive for the CAPM, 4-index, and 7-index models and negative for the FF and Carhart models.  
The average performance is affected by the extreme outliers of performance by some trusts.  The 
performance of the portfolio of all trusts is small and close to zero and none are statistically 
significant for all factor models.  This result suggests that the performance of the trusts, in 
aggregate, is neutral and neither adds or destroys value to investors.    
   To explore the impact of the benchmark model on performance in more detail, for each 
trust we calculate the range between the largest and smallest ap across the five linear factor 
models as in Ferson and Lin(2010).  We then compute the percentiles of the cross-sectional 
distribution of the range in performance across the factor models.   The median range in 
performance across models is 0.541% and the interquartile range of the variation in performance 
is between 0.323% and 1.254%.  The range in performance suggests that the benchmark model 
has a significant impact on individual trust performance and is similar to prior studies such as 
Lehmann and Modest(1987), Grinblatt and Titman(1994), Fletcher and Forbes(2002), and 
Ferson and Lin(2010) on open-end funds. 
 The standard errors of the estimated performance of the individual trusts in Table 2 are 
large in many cases and show a great deal of variation across trusts.  The median standard error 
of ap varies between 0.488% (FF) and 0.554% (CAPM) using excess stock returns.  The large 
standard errors suggest that the performance of the trusts will be estimated imprecisely and will 
be difficult to detect either significant superior or inferior performance.  The magnitude of the 
median standard error is similar in size to the median range in performance across models, which 
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is similar result to Ferson and Lin(2010) although the estimated medians are larger for closed-
end funds here compared to the open-end mutual funds of Ferson and Lin. 
 Table 2 also shows that there is a wide spread in residual volatility across the individual 
trusts for each factor model.  The median residual volatility ranges between 4.978% (7-index) 
and 5.981 (CAPM).  The spread between the bottom 10% of trusts and the top 10% of trusts in 
residual volatility is 3.375% and 17.345% for the CAPM and 3.051% and 16.635% for the 7-
index model.  This result suggests that a large proportion of the volatility of the excess stock 
returns of the trusts are not captured by the benchmark models.  The large spread in residual 
volatility across trusts suggests that the impact of investor heterogeneity on fund performance 
will vary across trusts (Ferson and Lin(2010)).   
 We next use the bootstrap resampling approach of Fama and French(2010) to examine 
whether the best and worst performing investment trusts is due to skill or luck.  Table 3 reports 
the results for the linear factor models.  The table reports selected percentiles from the cross-
sectional distribution of actual t(ap) statistics15.  In parentheses below are the average simulated 
(across 10,000 trials) t(ap) statistic in the () brackets under the null hypothesis of zero trust 
performance and the proportion (%) of simulated t(ap) statistics that lie below the corresponding 
actual t(ap) statistic across the 10,000 trials in the [] brackets. 
  
Table 3 here 
 
                                                          
15
 We use the t(ap) statistic, rather than ap, since it corrects for differences in standard errors 
across trusts due to different residual volatilities, and a different number of return observations 
(see Fama and French(2010)). 
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 Table 3 shows that there is no evidence of significant superior performance by trusts 
relative to any factor model.  For the top 1% of trusts, the actual t(ap) statistic is below the 
average simulated t(ap) statistic.  For the top 10% of trusts, the actual t(ap) statistic only lies 
above the average simulated t(ap) statistic for the 4-index model.  In the CAPM, FF, and Carhart 
models, the simulated t(ap) statistic lies above the actual t(ap) statistic in the vast majority of 
trials for both the top 10% and 1% of trusts.  In the 4-index and 7-index models, the simulated 
t(ap) statistic lies above the actual t(ap) statistic in the vast majority of trials for the top 1% of 
trusts.  For the top 10% of trusts relative to the 4-index and 7-index models, the actual t(ap) 
statistic lies above the simulated t(ap) statistic in the majority of trials but is well below levels 
which are deemed to produce significant superior performance.  These results suggest that the 
best performing investment trusts do not add significant value to investors beyond what we 
would expect by chance.  This result is similar to Fama and French(2010) who find that the best 
performing U.S. open-end mutual funds do not add significant value using net fund returns. 
 On a more positive note, we find no evidence of significant inferior performance by the 
worst performing trusts beyond what we would expect by chance.  For the bottom 10% and 
bottom 1% of trusts, the average simulated t(ap) statistic lies below the actual t(ap) statistic.  For 
the CAPM, 4-index, and 7-index models, the simulated t(ap) statistic lies below the actual t(ap) 
statistic in the vast majority of trials at the bottom 25%, 10%, and 1% of trusts.  For the FF and 
Carhart models, the simulated t(ap) statistic lies below the actual t(ap) statistic in the majority of 
trials at the bottom 25%, 10%, and 1% of trusts with the exception of the FF model at the bottom 
10% of trusts.  The results suggest that the worst performing trusts do not destroy value for 
investors beyond what we would expect in a world of zero performance.  This finding stands in 
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contrast to that observed for open-end U.S. mutual funds in Fama and French(2010).  Fama and 
French find that the worst performing funds have significant inferior performance. 
 The results in Table 3 suggests that individual trusts neither add or destroy value to 
investors when we ignore the issue of investor heterogeneity on the performance of the 
individual trusts16.  However when we recognise the issue of investor heterogeneity it is possible 
that different investors will value the trusts differently from what we observe in Tables 2 and 3.  
We examine the impact of investor heterogeneity on the performance of the trusts using the 
different benchmark models.  We estimate the upper bounds of Ferson and Lin(2010) in equation 
(4) using unconditional moments.  Panel A of Table 4 reports percentiles from the cross-
sectional distribution of upper bounds of investor heterogeneity on fund performance.  The SR 
row at the bottom of panel A is the maximum (adjusted) Sharpe ratio available from the set of 
the N primitive excess returns in a given benchmark model.  In panel B of the table, we report 
percentiles from the cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the 
upper bounds equal zero.  N is the number of trusts where the t-statistic is significant at the 5% 
level using a one-tail test.  Panel C of the table reports the percentiles from the cross-sectional 
distribution of the actual values of |ap| - Upper Bound.  In parentheses below is the proportion 
(%) of times that the simulated values of |ap| - Upper Bound lie below the actual values of |ap| - 
Upper Bound.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
                                                          
16
 The lack of funds with significant positive alphas might be due to the reverse survivorship bias 
of Linnainmaa(2012). 
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 Panel A of Table 4 shows that investor heterogeneity has a large impact on the 
performance measures using linear factor models.  Different investors are likely to evaluate the 
trusts very differently from what we observe in Tables 2 and 3.  The median upper bound in 
panel A of Table 5 ranges between 0.420% (CAPM) and 2.048% (Carhart).  The median upper 
bounds are a lot larger for the Carhart, 4-index, and 7-index models compared to the CAPM and 
FF models.  This result stems from the fact that the maximum Sharpe ratio is a lot larger for 
these three models due to the inclusion of the WML factor.  For the bottom 1% of trusts relative 
to the multifactor models, the upper bound is 0.345% (FF),  0.807% (Carhart), 0.617% (4-index), 
and 0.694% (7-index).  Even for the FF model, the upper bound for the bottom 1% of trusts is 
0.345%.  These results suggest that investor heterogeneity is likely to be an important issue for 
nearly every investment trust using the multifactor models. 
 We can compare the point estimates of the upper bounds in panel A of Table 4 to the 
uncertainty of the estimated performance measures using the linear factor models (SE(ap)) and 
the impact of the benchmark model in fund performance as in Ferson and Lin(2010).  The 
median standard error of ap is higher than the median upper bound for the CAPM model but the 
median upper bound is considerably larger than the median SE(ap) for the multifactor models.  
The median range (best and worst performance) in ap across the 5 benchmark models is 0.541%, 
which is larger than median upper bound of the CAPM model but considerably lower than the 
median upper bounds for the multifactor models.  These results suggest that investor 
heterogeneity is more important than either the uncertainty in the estimated ap and the choice of 
the benchmark model when using the upper bounds from the multifactor models.  The impact of 
investor heterogeneity on investment trust performance is greater than observed in open-end U.S. 
mutual funds in Ferson and Lin(2010).  The difference of our findings with Ferson and Lin stems 
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from the higher residual volatility of our sample of investment trusts compared to that observed 
in Ferson and Lin. 
 The point estimates of the upper bounds in panel A of Table 4 suggest that investor 
heterogeneity will be an important issue for nearly all trusts.  This finding is confirmed in the 
statistical tests in panels B and C of Table 4.  In panel B, for the multifactor models nearly all 
trusts have upper bounds that are significantly different from zero.  The proportion of trusts with 
a significant t-statistic rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero upper bound is greater than or equal 
to 98.4% for the multifactor models.  Even for the bottom 10% of trusts, the t-statistics are large 
especially for the Carhart, 4-index, and 7-index models.  For the CAPM model, we are not able 
to reject the null hypothesis that the upper bound equals zero for any trust.  This result stems 
from the smaller maximum Sharpe ratio compared to the other benchmark models.  The lack of 
statistical significance of the upper bounds for the CAPM would question the importance of 
investor heterogeneity for this model. 
 In panel C of Table 4, we provide a different perspective on investor heterogeneity and 
consider whether there are any trusts where investors will agree on the sign of the trust 
performance.  It is only for the CAPM, where for the top 25% of trusts the absolute performance 
of the trust exceeds that of the upper bound and investors would agree on the sign of the 
performance.  For the FF model, it is only for top 10% of trusts where the absolute performance 
of the trust exceeds the upper bound.  For the Carhart, 4-index, and 7-index models, it is only for 
the top 1% of trusts where the absolute performance exceeds that of the upper bound.  These 
results suggest for the multifactor models, that it is only for a small minority of trusts where 
investors will actually agree on the sign of the performance when looking at the actual values of 
|ap| - Upper Bound.  However when we consider the simulation results in parentheses, none of 
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the cases where the absolute performance exceeds the upper bound are greater than what you 
expect by chance.  The only case near to levels of statistical significance is for the FF model 
where for the top 1% of trusts the actual |ap| - Upper Bound exceeds the simulated |ap| - Upper 
Bound in 87.9% of trials.  
 Table 4 suggests that with the exception of the CAPM, the upper bounds are significantly 
different from zero for nearly all trusts.  There is no evidence that investors will agree on the sign 
of performance for any trust beyond what we would expect by chance.  These results suggest that 
investor heterogeneity will be an important issue for investment trusts17.  We next examine the 
impact of using conditional moments to compute the upper bounds.  Ferson and Lin(2010) point 
out that the use of conditional moments can have two effects on the upper bounds.  The first 
effect is that the funds can have lower residual volatility, which would lower the upper bound.  
The second effect is a higher expected conditional Sharpe ratio using conditional moments, 
which would lead to a higher upper bound.  The impact of conditional moments on the upper 
bound will depend upon which effect dominates.  Table 5 reports the same results as Table 4.  
The SR row at the bottom of panel A is the maximum (adjusted) average conditional Sharpe ratio 
available from the set of the N primitive excess returns in a given benchmark model.   
  
Table 5 here 
 
                                                          
17
 In unreported tests (available on request), we estimate the upper bounds using the NAV excess 
returns of the trusts.  We find similar results to Table 4 except the magnitude of the bounds is 
lower. 
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 The bottom row of panel A of Table 5 shows that there is a sharp rise in the average 
conditional Sharpe ratio in the N primitive excess returns for each benchmark model when we 
incorporate conditioning information compared to the unconditional Sharpe ratios in Table 4.  
Allowing for conditioning information leads to a more favorable risk/return trade-off and is 
similar to Ferson and Siegel(2009) among others.  This increase shows that the impact on the 
Sharpe ratio of using conditioning information is more important than the impact on residual 
volatility, which leads to the expected upper bounds in panel A of Table 5 being a lot larger than 
that in Table 4. 
 The median expected upper bounds in panel A of Table 5 range between 1.295% 
(CAPM) and 3.111% (7-index).  The impact of investor heterogeneity is again largest for the 
Carhart, 4-index, and 7-index models.  Investor heterogeneity will be an important issue for all 
investment trusts as even the bottom 1% of trusts has an expected upper bound of 0.466% 
(CAPM), 0.907% (FF), 1.239% (Carhart), 1.032% (4-index), and 1.220% (7-index).   
 The point estimates in panel A of Table 5 suggest that investor heterogeneity has a 
greater impact when using the model of conditional moments compared to panel A of Table 4.  
This finding also holds in the statistical tests of panels B and C of Table 5.  In panel B of Table 
5, nearly all of the trusts have significant upper bounds across all five linear factor models, even 
for the CAPM.  We can reject the null hypothesis that the upper bounds of the trusts equal zero 
for greater than or equal to 98.9% of trusts.  The magnitude of the t-statistics are larger in panel 
B compared to the corresponding t-statistics in Table 4. 
 In panel C of Table 5, it is only for the top 1% of trusts where investors agree on the sign 
of performance for four of the five factor models using the point estimates of |ap| - Upper Bound.  
For the Carhart model, even for the top 1% of trusts investors do not agree on the sign of 
24 
 
performance.  The simulation results in parentheses suggest that for the top 1% of trusts relative 
to the CAPM, 4-index, and 7-index models, the actual value of |ap| - Upper Bound is not greater 
than we would expect by chance.  It is only for the FF model, where the actual value of |ap| - 
Upper Bound for the top 1% of trusts is close to levels of statistical significance where the actual 
|ap| - Upper Bound exceeds the simulated |ap| - Upper Bound in 91.94% of trials.  The findings in 
panel C of Tables 4 and 5 link in with the results of Table 3.  Given that in Table 3, we find no 
evidence of trusts with significant superior performance and in panel C of Tables 4 and 5 we find 
no trust which generates performance above the upper bound beyond what we expect by chance, 
then there is no trust about which all investors can agree that the trust adds value.  
 The results in Table 5 suggests that using a model of conditional moments to estimate the 
upper bounds implies that investor heterogeneity will have an even greater impact on evaluating 
investment trust performance.  This result is similar to Ferson and Lin(2010) for open-end funds.  
However the magnitude of our bounds are greater due to the higher residual volatility of our 
sample of closed-end funds.  The importance of investor heterogeneity on performance is also 
consistent with Ahn et al(2009).   
The final issue we address is to examine whether investor heterogeneity has any impact 
on the relation between the trust premium on the past NAV performance.  Table 6 reports the 
results from the Fama and MacBeth(1973) cross-sectional regressions of equation (6).  The table 
reports the average coefficients from the annual cross-sectional regressions and the t-statistics in 
parentheses.  The t-statistics are corrected for the effects of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the automatic lag selection (without prewhitening) method of Newey and 
West(1994).  The final row of each panel is the average adjusted R2 from the annual cross-
sectional regressions.  In panel A of the table, we report the cross-sectional regression results 
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excluding the Disagreep interaction variables.  Panel B (C) reports the results using the actual 
values of the Disagreep measure (DisagreepH and DisagreepM dummy variables).   
 
Table 6 here 
 
 Panel A of Table 6 shows that there is a positive relation between the average trust 
premium and the lag NAV performance.  The positive relation is statistically significant for the 
Carhart and 7-index models.  This positive relation provides some support for the performance 
theory of the discount and is similar to Khorana et al(2009) for U.S. closed-end funds and 
Dimson and Minio-Paluello(2001) for U.K. funds, although both studies use different measures 
of past NAV performance.  Two out of the three control variables have a significant relation with 
the average premium of the trust.  There is a significant positive relation between the average 
premium and the size of the trust (using total NAV) and between the average premium and the 
DY of the trust.  Larger trusts and trusts with higher DY have larger average premiums.  The 
relation between size and the trust premium differs from Khorana et al who find a significant 
negative relation.   
 Panel B of Table 6 shows that when we include the Disagreep interaction variable in the 
cross-sectional regressions, there is now a significant positive relation between the average 
premium and lag NAV performance across all factor models.  There is a negative coefficient on 
the Disagreep interaction variable across all models, which suggests that trusts with a greater 
disagreement about performance have a weaker relation between the average premium and lag 
NAV performance.  The negative coefficient is statistically significant for the CAPM and 4-
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index models at the 10% significance level.  The size and DY control variables remain 
significant in panel B of Table 6. 
 We can use the magnitude of the slope coefficients on ap and ap*Disagreep to examine the 
impact of investor heterogeneity on the relation between the average trust premium and past 
NAV performance other things being equal.  For a 1% change in the lag NAV performance, the 
change in the average monthly premium will range (for the trusts with the minimum and 
maximum levels of disagreement) between 0.195 and -1.027 (CAPM), 0.144 and -0.618 (FF), 
0.107 and -0.112 (Carhart), 0.115 and -0.671 (4-index), and 0.156 and -0.448 (7-index).  The 
range in the change in the average monthly premium in response to the lag NAV performance is 
extremely wide and suggests that the magnitude of the slope coefficient on the Disagreep 
interaction variable is economically significant. 
 Using the dummy variables to capture the disagreement about trust performance in panel 
C of Table 6 confirms that investor heterogeneity has an impact on the relation between the 
average premium and the lag NAV performance.  There is a significant positive relation between 
the average premium and the lag NAV performance for the Carhart, and 7-index models.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient on ap captures the relation between the average premium and the lag 
NAV performance, other things being equal, for trusts with the smallest levels of disagreement.  
For these trusts, a 1% change in the lag NAV performance leads to a change in the average 
premium ranging between 0.071 (CAPM) and 0.140 (Carhart). 
 There is a negative coefficient on the ap*DisagreepH variable.  The change in the average 
premium to a 1% change in the lag NAV performance, other things being equal, for the trusts 
with the largest disagreement range between -0.122 (4-index) and 0.074 (7-index).  Trusts with 
the largest disagreement either have a negative change in the premium or a smaller positive 
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change in the premium in response to the lag NAV performance.  The magnitude of the slope 
coefficients are large in economic terms for all models except the 7-index model.   
 The coefficients on the ap*DisagreepM variable are either negative or positive depending 
upon the benchmark model used.  For trusts in the Medium disagreement group, the change in 
the average premium for a 1% change in the lag NAV performance ranges between 0.018 (FF) 
and 0.200 (CAPM).  For the FF, Carhart, and 4-index models, the trusts with the medium level of 
disagreement have a weaker relation between the average premium and lag NAV performance 
compared to the trusts with the smallest disagreement. 
 The results in Table 6 suggest that although the coefficients on the disagreement 
interaction variables are in the main not statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficients 
are economically significant.  The results suggest that investor heterogeneity has an impact on 
the relation between the average trust premium and the lag NAV performance.  Trusts with the 
largest disagreement about performance have a weaker relation between the average premium 
and the lag NAV performance.  Our findings support the results in Ferson and Lin(2010), 
although not as statistically significant, that investor heterogeneity is an important issue in 
closed-end fund performance studies. 
V Conclusions 
 We use the approach of Ferson and Lin(2010) to examine the impact of investor 
heterogeneity on the performance of U.K. investment trusts relative to a number of linear factor 
models.  There are three main findings in our study.  First, we find no evidence that investment 
trusts either add or destroy value for investors.  There are no trusts with significant superior or 
inferior performance beyond what we expect by chance.  This result differs from Kosowski, 
Timmerman, Wermers and White(2006) and Fama and French(2010) for U.S. open-end mutual 
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funds and for Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and 2¶6XOOLYDQ(2008) for U.K. open-end mutual funds 
where the worst funds have significant inferior performance using net fund returns.   
 Second, we find that investor heterogeneity has a significant impact on the evaluation of 
investment trust performance.  The magnitude of the bounds in Ferson and Lin(2010) is large in 
economic terms and often exceeds that of the standard errors of the estimated performance and 
the impact of alternative benchmarks on performance.  We find using unconditional moments, 
that for the multifactor models nearly all trusts have upper bounds that are significantly different 
from zero.  We find no evidence that investors will agree on the sign of performance for any trust 
beyond what we would expect by chance.  This result, coupled with our first finding, suggests 
that there are no trusts where all investors can agree that the trust adds value.  Using a model of 
conditional moments, the impact of investor heterogeneity becomes greater and the magnitude of 
the bounds increase and we can reject the null hypothesis of zero upper bounds for nearly all 
trusts across all the factor models.  These results are similar to Ferson and Lin but the impact is 
larger here since the upper bound of Ferson and Lin is greater when the funds have higher 
residual volatility, which we observe in our sample of closed-end funds.  The importance of 
investor heterogeneity on trust performance is also consistent with the evidence in Ahn et 
al(2009) and Fletcher and Marshall(2012). 
 Third, we find using the lower bounds of Ferson and Lin(2010) that investor 
heterogeneity has an impact on the relation between the trust premium and the past NAV 
performance.  We find that trusts with the largest disagreement about performance have a weaker 
relation between the average premium and past NAV performance.  This result is similar to 
Ferson and Lin who find for open-end U.S. mutual funds that funds with larger disagreement 
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about performance have a significantly weaker relation between fund flows and past 
performance. 
 Our results suggest that investor heterogeneity is an important issue in the evaluation of 
investment trust performance.  Our sample of funds only includes U.K. equity funds.  An 
interesting extension of this study would be to explore the impact of heterogeneity on the 
performance of international funds.  Ferson and Lin(2010) point out that a key issue for future 
research is the development of clientele specific fund performance measure measures.  The NA 
performance bounds of Ahn et al(2009) provide one way to do this for the clienteles most 
favorable and least favorable to the fund.  However this captures the extremes and a fuller 
examination of this topic warrants more research.  We leave these issues to future research.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Investment Trusts and Factors 
Panel A 
Trusts  
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Bottom 1% -7.654 3.169 -86.921 6.112 
Bottom 10% -0.774 5.121 -60.392 13.470 
Bottom 25% -0.021 5.851 -32.094 17.329 
Median 0.365 7.143 -22.867 23.409 
Top 25% 0.645 11.062 -17.506 39.431 
Top 10% 1.050 18.491 -12.088 85.401 
Top 1% 5.842 79.357 -5.897 454.673 
Mean 0.248 11.073 -28.772 47.148 
Panel B 
Factors 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Market 0.297 4.239 -13.797 10.534 
SMB -0.075 3.815 -12.501 14.535 
HML 0.430 2.385 -14.038 7.907 
WML 1.015 3.969 -28.403 12.282 
Large 0.314 3.928 -14.393 10.667 
S-L -0.010 3.557 -13.555 11.345 
AHML  0.268 3.065 -9.649 8.993 
S-M -0.046 2.170 -6.336 7.228 
M-L 0.036 2.994 -14.001 11.386 
LHML  0.222 3.793 -14.821 12.888 
MHML 0.206 5.122 -28.018 17.668 
SHML 0.488 3.419 -28.403 17.599 
 
The table reports summary statistics of the monthly excess stock returns of U.K. investment 
trusts with U.K. equity objectives and factors in the linear factor models between January 1990 
and December 2010.  The summary statistics include the mean, standard deviation (Std Dev), 
minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) of monthly excess returns (%).  In panel A of the table, all 
trusts with greater than 24 stock return observations are sorted separately by the statistic in the 
column and various percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution across individual trusts are 
reported.  Panel B reports the summary statistics for the factors in the linear factor models. 
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Table 2 Performance of Individual Investment Trusts 
 
Panel A: CAPM ap SE(ap) ıXpt) ap(VW) 
Bottom 1% -8.059 0.096 2.038 -0.008 
Bottom 10% -0.879 0.208 3.375 (-0.06) 
Bottom 25% -0.181 0.329 4.376  
Median 0.095 0.554 5.981  
Top 25% 0.355 1.079 9.763  
Top 10% 0.859 1.973 17.345  
Top 1% 7.632 10.697 76.289  
Mean 0.063 1.057 9.839  
Panel B: FF ap  SE(ap) ıXpt) ap(VW) 
Bottom 1% -11.817 0.110 2.023 -0.059 
Bottom 10% -1.228 0.193 3.164 (-0.61) 
Bottom 25% -0.305 0.264 3.749  
Median -0.007 0.488 5.188  
Top 25% 0.277 0.990 8.933  
Top 10% 0.754 2.187 17.119  
Top 1% 5.887 10.392 70.308  
Mean -0.228 1.006 9.152  
Panel C: Carhart ap  SE(ap) ıXpt) ap(VW) 
Bottom 1% -11.852 0.131 2.007 -0.007 
Bottom 10% -1.120 0.224 3.131 (-0.07) 
Bottom 25% -0.306 0.291 3.743  
Median 0.029 0.531 5.098  
Top 25% 0.372 1.035 8.888  
Top 10% 0.754 2.201 16.916  
Top 1% 6.716 10.562 70.246  
Mean -0.162 1.059 9.044  
Panel D: 4-index ap  SE(ap) ıXpt) ap(VW) 
Bottom 1% -9.680 0.142 2.098 0.079 
Bottom 10% -0.995 0.207 3.154 (0.75) 
Bottom 25% -0.196 0.302 3.705  
Median 0.187 0.525 5.142  
Top 25% 0.528 1.012 8.951  
Top 10% 1.037 2.124 17.112  
Top 1% 5.906 9.864 73.063  
Mean 0.066 1.038 9.101  
Panel E: 7-index ap  SE(ap) ıXpt) ap(VW) 
Bottom 1% -13.217 0.141 2.070 0.066 
Bottom 10% -0.994 0.208 3.051 (0.67) 
Bottom 25% -0.245 0.305 3.601  
Median 0.154 0.525 4.978  
Top 25% 0.436 1.044 8.795  
Top 10% 0.939 2.063 16.635  
Top 1% 17.923 15.283 66.851  
Mean 0.114 1.155 8.749  
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The table reports percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of investment trust performance 
between January 1990 and December 2010.  The unconditional Jensen(1968) performance of all 
trusts with greater than 24 stock return observations is estimated relative to five linear factor 
models.  The percentiles are reported for the Jensen performance (ap), the standard error of 
performance (SE(ap)) DQG WKH YRODWLOLW\ RI WKH UHJUHVVLRQ UHVLGXDOV ıupt)) where the 
observations are sorted separately by the statistic in the column.  The final column reports the 
performance and t-statistic in parentheses of the value weighted portfolio of all trusts (ap(VW)).  
The standard errors and t-statistics are corrected for the effects of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the automatic lag selection approach (without prewhitening) of Newey and 
West(1994). 
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Table 3 Percentiles of t(ap) Estimates of Simulated and Actual Trust Excess Returns 
 CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% -2.591 
(-3.756) 
[81.390] 
-2.315 
(-3.480) 
[93.100] 
-2.649 
(-3.879) 
[84.240] 
-2.705 
(-4.146) 
[86.440] 
-2.471 
(-4.975) 
[94.910] 
Bottom 10% -1.005 
(-1.393) 
[87.730] 
-1.421 
(-1.431) 
[49.810] 
-1.403 
(-1.480) 
[59.130] 
-1.229 
(-1.492) 
[81.840] 
-1.201 
(-1.527) 
[87.060] 
Bottom 25% -0.382 
(-0.709) 
[84.510] 
-0.705 
(-0.727) 
[52.950] 
-0.666 
(-0.748) 
[62.640] 
-0.395 
(-0.754) 
[92.970] 
-0.522 
(-0.771) 
[84.820] 
Median 0.209 
(-0.003) 
[75.260] 
-0.020 
(0.001) 
[46.520] 
0.035 
(0.001) 
[56.290] 
0.288 
(-0.006) 
[90.230] 
0.304 
(-0.002) 
[91.210] 
Top 25% 0.743 
(0.684) 
[59.070] 
0.633 
(0.713) 
[38.030] 
0.717 
(0.733) 
[48.860] 
1.132 
(0.724) 
[95.060] 
1.026 
(0.753) 
[87.280] 
Top 10% 1.112 
(1.305) 
[28.590] 
0.978 
(1.363) 
[7.360] 
1.265 
(1.418) 
[30.200] 
1.615 
(1.405) 
[79.000] 
1.462 
(1.463) 
[51.660] 
Top 1% 1.752 
(2.555) 
[3.680] 
2.330 
(2.719) 
[24.670] 
2.667 
(2.935) 
[37.240] 
2.708 
(2.969) 
[38.340] 
2.544 
(3.049) 
[20.470] 
 
The table reports percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of actual t(ap) statistics of 
individual trust performance between January 1990 and December 2010.  In parentheses below 
are the average simulated (across 10,000 trials) t(ap) statistic in the () brackets under the null 
hypothesis of zero trust performance and the proportion (%) of simulated t(ap) statistics that lie 
below the corresponding actual t(ap) statistic across the 10,000 trials in the [] brackets.  All trusts 
are required to have greater than 24 stock return (simulated benchmark-adjusted stock return) 
observations when computing performance.  The performance of the trusts is evaluated relative 
to five linear factor models.  The t-statistics are corrected for the effects of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation using the automatic lag selection approach (without prewhitening) of Newey 
and West(1994).        
 
34 
 
Table 4 Upper Bounds on the Impact of Investor Heterogeneity: Unconditional Moments 
Panel A CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% 0.143 0.345 0.807 0.617 0.694 
Bottom 10% 0.237 0.540 1.258 0.927 1.022 
Bottom 25% 0.307 0.640 1.504 1.089 1.206 
Median 0.420 0.886 2.048 1.511 1.667 
Top 25% 0.686 1.525 3.571 2.631 2.946 
Top 10% 1.219 2.924 6.796 5.031 5.572 
Top 1% 5.362 12.008 28.221 21.481 22.395 
Mean 0.691 1.563 3.633 2.675 2.931 
SR 0.070 0.171 0.402 0.294 0.335 
Panel B CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% 0.978 1.461 1.905 1.695 1.826 
Bottom 10% 1.264 2.155 3.646 2.851 3.203 
Bottom 25% 1.291 2.291 4.314 3.196 3.675 
Median 1.315 2.367 4.774 3.372 3.974 
Top 25% 1.330 2.412 5.069 3.471 4.110 
Top 10% 1.345 2.466 5.270 3.563 4.223 
Top 1% 1.409 2.548 5.588 3.783 4.571 
N 0 0.984 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Panel C CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% -1.223 
[56.500] 
-7.842 
[35.550] 
-22.143 
[25.610] 
-16.935 
[23.660] 
-9.521 
[73.190] 
Bottom 10% -0.426 
[48.250] 
-1.736 
[49.410] 
-4.777 
[47.250] 
-3.362 
[48.540] 
-3.181 
[68.570] 
Bottom 25% -0.261 
[44.500] 
-0.879 
[53.290] 
-2.564 
[46.230] 
-1.709 
[53.080] 
-1.977 
[50.080] 
Median -0.104 
[39.430] 
-0.554 
[51.890] 
-1.652 
[41.510] 
-1.022 
[57.850] 
-1.178 
[59.610] 
Top 25% 0.117 
[31.170] 
-0.341 
[45.720] 
-1.103 
[51.250] 
-0.653 
[61.760] 
-0.845 
[53.710] 
Top 10% 0.910 
[44.970] 
0.134 
[55.620] 
-0.761 
[43.150] 
-0.323 
[54.550] 
-0.481 
[41.630] 
Top 1% 7.327 
[53.510] 
7.964 
[87.900] 
2.286 
[60.690] 
3.382 
[56.100] 
5.387 
[59.650] 
The table examines the impact of the upper bound of investor heterogeneity of Ferson and 
Lin(2010), using unconditional moments, on individual investment trust performance between 
January 1990 and December 2010.  Panel A of the table reports the percentiles of the upper 
bounds for individual trusts.  The final row of panel A reports the adjusted maximum Sharpe 
ratio (SR) for each set of factor excess returns adjusted for finite sample bias as in Ferson and 
Siegel(2003) when the number of factors in the benchmark model is greater than 1.  Panel B of 
the table reports percentiles of the estimated t-statistics of the upper bound where the standard 
errors are estimated as the standard deviation of the simulated upper bounds across 10,000 trials.  
N is the proportion of trusts where the individual t-statistic is significant at the 5% level using a 
one-tail test.  Panel C of the table reports the percentiles of the actual values of |ap| - Upper 
Bound.  In parentheses below is the proportion (%) of the simulated |ap| - Upper Bound which lie 
below the actual |ap| - Upper Bound across the 10,000 trials.  All trusts are required to have 
greater than 24 stock return (simulated benchmark-adjusted stock return) observations when 
computing performance and the upper bound.  The performance of the trusts is evaluated relative 
to five linear factor models.    
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Table 5 Upper Bounds on the Impact of Investor Heterogeneity: Conditional Moments 
Panel A CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% 0.466 0.907 1.239 1.032 1.220 
Bottom 10% 0.742 1.379 1.858 1.509 1.758 
Bottom 25% 0.986 1.675 2.310 1.816 2.078 
Median 1.295 2.291 3.111 2.481 2.867 
Top 25% 2.101 3.816 5.219 4.247 4.983 
Top 10% 3.681 7.111 9.541 7.512 8.700 
Top 1% 16.842 29.958 41.131 33.678 36.123 
Mean 2.157 3.936 5.363 4.292 4.921 
SR 0.229 0.450 0.621 0.494 0.591 
Panel B CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% 1.595 1.879 2.017 1.884 2.012 
Bottom 10% 2.886 3.615 4.116 3.775 3.676 
Bottom 25% 3.252 4.308 5.144 4.791 4.698 
Median 3.468 4.897 6.148 5.619 5.877 
Top 25% 3.597 5.349 6.962 6.297 6.681 
Top 10% 3.647 5.529 7.393 6.646 7.056 
Top 1% 3.749 5.763 7.727 6.889 7.350 
N 0.989 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Panel C CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Bottom 1% -9.271 
[53.160] 
-25.301 
[29.440] 
-35.054 
[29.090] 
-29.133 
[28.770] 
-19.121 
[77.230] 
Bottom 10% -2.538 
[55.540] 
-5.566 
[52.880] 
-7.800 
[44.940] 
-5.867 
[64.500] 
-5.988 
[86.170] 
Bottom 25% -1.407 
[61.690] 
-2.929 
[64.110] 
-4.049 
[62.340] 
-3.151 
[72.310] 
-3.775 
[64.580] 
Median -0.977 
[54.280] 
-1.890 
[64.430] 
-2.719 
[49.930] 
-1.964 
[78.940] 
-2.234 
[78.310] 
Top 25% -0.637 
[50.830] 
-1.317 
[70.400] 
-1.853 
[67.590] 
-1.369 
[85.130] 
-1.704 
[78.980] 
Top 10% -0.351 
[40.960] 
-1.020 
[57.930] 
-1.526 
[37.140] 
-1.066 
[63.130] 
-1.329 
[46.480] 
Top 1% 2.838 
[59.910] 
2.887 
[91.940] 
-0.109 
[31.360] 
0.598 
[37.370] 
0.499 
[19.500] 
 
The table examines the impact of the upper bound of investor heterogeneity of Ferson and 
Lin(2010), using a model of conditional moments, on individual investment trust performance 
between January 1990 and December 2010.  Panel A of the table reports the percentiles of the 
upper bounds for individual trusts.  The final row of panel A reports the adjusted average 
conditional maximum Sharpe ratio (SR) for each set of factor excess returns adjusted for finite 
sample bias as in Ferson and Siegel(2003) when the number of factors in the benchmark model is 
greater than 1.  Panel B of the table reports percentiles of the estimated t-statistics of the upper 
bound where the standard errors are estimated as the standard deviation of the simulated upper 
bounds across 10,000 trials.  Panel C of the table reports the percentiles of the actual values of 
|ap| - Upper Bound.  In parentheses below is the proportion (%) of the simulated |ap| - Upper 
Bound which lie below the actual |ap| - Upper Bound across the 10,000 trials.  All trusts are 
required to have greater than 24 stock return (simulated benchmark-adjusted stock return) 
observations when computing performance and the upper bound.  The performance of the trusts 
is evaluated relative to five linear factor models.    
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Table 6 Impact of Investor Heterogeneity on Relation between Trust Premium and Past NAV 
Performance 
 
Panel A CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Constant 0.238 
(1.26) 
0.141 
(0.71) 
-0.057 
(-0.19) 
-0.066 
(-0.25) 
0.136 
(0.71) 
ap 3.146 
(0.61) 
1.031 
(0.20) 
7.844 
(2.41)1 
3.928 
(1.45) 
12.271 
(2.14)1 
Total NAVp 0.034 
(2.42)1 
0.039 
(2.84)1 
0.057 
(2.84)1 
0.056 
(3.60)1 
0.045 
(3.33)1 
DYp 0.941 
(2.41)1 
1.043 
(2.69)1 
1.410 
(3.91)1 
1.054 
(7.09)1 
1.416 
(3.85)1 
Agep 0.005 
(0.26) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
-0.009 
(-0.71) 
-0.004 
(-0.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.80) 
R2 0.168 0.164 0.119 0.122 0.137 
Panel B CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Constant 0.302 
(1.55) 
0.122 
(0.56) 
0.104 
(1.11) 
-0.016 
(-0.06) 
0.306 
(1.97)1 
ap 20.073 
(2.57)1 
14.832 
(2.07)1 
10.951 
(2.47)1 
12.072 
(2.24)1 
16.028 
(1.89)2 
ap*Disagreep -5.301e+003 
(-1.77)2 
-3.473e+003 
(-1.34) 
-2.295e+003 
(-1.08) 
-6.703e+003 
(-1.64)2 
-6.529e+003 
(-1.38) 
Total NAVp 0.029 
(2.08)1 
0.042 
(2.89)1 
0.047 
(5.58)1 
0.052 
(3.01)1 
0.034 
(3.01)1 
DYp 1.131 
(2.73)1 
0.932 
(2.39)1 
1.250 
(8.29)1 
0.674 
(2.40)1 
1.037 
(5.38)1 
Agep 0.006 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
R2 0.186 0.188 0.153 0.153 0.170 
Panel C CAPM FF Carhart 4-index 7-index 
Constant 0.374 
(1.81)2 
0.097 
(0.41) 
-0.012 
(-0.07) 
-0.061 
(-0.19) 
0.255 
(1.65)2 
ap 7.127 
(1.28) 
13.673 
(1.21) 
14.045 
(1.93)2 
11.237 
(1.26) 
8.685 
(1.67)2 
ap*DisagreepH -13.984 
(-1.35) 
-19.843 
(-1.12) 
-6.719 
(-1.13) 
-23.468 
(-1.23) 
-1.317 
(-0.13) 
ap*DisagreepM 12.890 
(1.08) 
-11.842 
(-0.80) 
-8.114 
(-1.30) 
-9.007 
(-0.77) 
6.776 
(0.63) 
Total NAVp 0.024 
(1.60) 
0.043 
(2.56)1 
0.054 
(5.07)1 
0.056 
(2.81)1 
0.034 
(3.14)1 
DYp 1.065 
(2.43)1 
0.510 
(0.95) 
1.396 
(5.07)1 
0.556 
(1.47) 
1.249 
(5.60)1 
Agep 0.008 
(0.42) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
-0.008 
(-0.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.34) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
R2 0.201 0.175 0.129 0.155 0.168 
 
1
 Significant at 5% 
2
 Significant at 10% 
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The table reports the results of Fama and MacBeth(1973) cross-sectional regressions of the 
annual average monthly premium during the calendar year on a constant, lagged performance 
(ap) using the Net Asset Value (NAV) excess returns of the trusts, and the interaction between 
the lagged performance and the measure of the disagreement among investors about trust 
performance (Disagreep).  The Disagreep measure is estimated using the NAV excess returns of 
the trusts.  The regressions are run each year between 1993 and 2010.  The performance of the 
trusts is estimated during the prior 36 months relative to each factor model for all trusts with 
continuous NAV return data during the past 3 years and the Disagreep measure is assumed fixed 
across the whole sample period.  The cross-sectional regressions include control variables such 
as the total NAV of the trust, the dividend yield (DY), and the age of the trust at the start of the 
calendar year.  Each panel reports the time-series average coefficients and t-statistics in 
parentheses.  The final row of each panel is the time-series average of the adjusted R2.  In panel 
A of the table, the cross-sectional regressions are run excluding the interaction Disagreep 
variables.  In panel B of the table, the actual value of the disagreement measure is used and in 
panel C of the table, two dummy variables are used for the disagreement measure.  The 
DisagreepH  variable is 1 for trusts with the largest 1/3 of Disagreep measures and 0 otherwise, 
and the DisagreepM dummy variable is 1 for trusts with the second largest 1/3 of Disagreep 
measures and 0 otherwise.  The t-statistics are corrected for the effects of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation using the automatic lag selection approach (without prewhitening) of Newey 
and West(1994).        
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